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BOOK REVIEW
GEOFFREY SAMUEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW
THEORY AND METHOD
(Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2014)
Reviewed by Jacques Vanderlinden ∗
This is not a review in an ordinary sense of the word, i.e.: “7. a.
A general account or criticism of a literary work (esp. a new or
recent one) …” 1 or, according to Geoffrey Samuel, “a critical piece
aimed at the public on a particular book by a particular author”. 2
Comparing (or is it juxtaposing?) these definitions, they include a
common idea behind a radical: the review must be “critic-al.” Here
I am, sent back to my Shorter English Concise Dictionary in two
volumes, which gives me no solace, as the first two definitions—
apparently the most relevant—imply a judgment, even if it is a
“careful” one. To pass a judgment on anyone or anything is
something I intensely dislike. My first reaction was indeed to send
the book back to the Journal, as it was so completely
overwhelming me.
At the same time, it attracted me irresistibly as, due to my
limited knowledge, I was willing to agree that it was “the single
(my underlining) introductory work exclusively devoted to
comparative law methodology” (at back cover). Thus I could only
infer that I had in my hands a rare thing and my curiosity was even
more awakened than it was permanently by nature.
∗ Professor of Law emeritus (Free University of Brussels and University
of Moncton); Former Secretary General of the International African Law
Association and of the Société Jean Bodin pour l’Histoire comparative des
Institutions; Honorary Full Member of the Académie royale des Sciences
d’Outre-mer; Full Member of the International Academy of Comparative Law;
Foreign Member of the Accademia nazionale dei Lincei.
1. WILLIAM LITTLE, H. W. FOWLER, AND J. COULSON, SHORTER OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (C. T. Onions ed., 1973).
2. GEOFFREY SAMUEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW THEORY
AND METHOD 26 (European Academy of Legal Theory Series, vol. 11, 2014).
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Further, the book immediately revealed at first sight in some
places a use of figures; their quality delighted my inner self
interested in teaching. I personally had rarely been fully satisfied
by my quasi-total incapacity at concretizing imaginations that
frequently erupted in my personal work. Finally, why should not
Geoffrey Samuel’s work provide an answer to questions which
sometimes appeared to be of paramount importance whenever I
was confronted with the wish or the obligation to compare a piece
of law foreign to the one I had been taught at university—if ever
so—many, many years ago? These were my expectations. They
certainly contributed to my final decision to embark on this nonreview. All things having been considered with due care, I decided
accordingly to roam in the book leisurely according to my mood
and my personal remembrances, leaving to the Editor of the
Journal the responsibility to incur or not the wrath of the Author
by publishing or not these pages.
1. I had an immediate question. Why, in 2014, should one keep
in the title of such a fundamental and innovative book a reference
to a “strange,” 3 and for me non-existent, topic: “comparative law?”
Could it not be adequately replaced in English by “comparing
laws”? Especially since Pierre Legrand—one of, if not, the most
quoted authors in the book—has for five years proposed replacing
these two words in French with the more adequate “comparer les
droits.” 4 To which, quite unusually, he added in the title of his
book, the adverb “résolument,” which leaves me perplexed and of
which I would dispose easily if I was Samuel. Was he referring to
his own determination—this is doubtful as he never appeared as
someone cultivating shyness—or did he only wish his work not to
be confused too easily (at first sight of course) with that of
Vanderlinden bearing the same title but for the adverb? 5 Let us
3. Id. at 8.
4. See, e.g., PIERRE LEGRAND, COMPARER LES DROITS, RÉSOLUMENT
(2005).
5. See JACQUES VANDERLINDEN, COMPARER LES DROITS (1995).
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only hope that Legrand did not imply that the latter was
irresolute—for whatever it means—in his approach to comparative
law! Chi lo sa?
2. Quite quickly I realized that I was confronted with a
monument of sophistication of which I had no previous idea
whatsoever. For one more time indeed (but this had happened in
other branches of law), it came to my mind that I had been for
decades in the position of Molière’s Mr. Jourdain, comparing
without knowing what the verb really meant and thus ignoring
what I was really doing. Since 1953 indeed, when René Dekkers—
then a professor of Roman Law at Brussels Free University—
threw a young student (with two years’ experience at swallowing
essentially literature in the humanities and trying to reproduce it to
the letter for two years in June) into the cauldron of the comparison
of laws by suggesting that he start a thesis devoted to a study of
codification without any limit throughout space and time, I never,
never bothered either with methodology or with legal theory
concerning what I was doing, which I believed was a kind of
comparison of laws. I was a simple avowed empiricist. Full stop.
3. Furthermore, I never claimed that any of my publications
was either a “significant and influential contribution to legal
knowledge” or “ranked amongst the most elegant and insightful
contributions” to the same. 6 My only excuse for having possibly
been part of “a tradition in comparative legal writing that can at
best be described as theoretically weak and at worst startlingly
trivial,” 7 is that, obviously, the book under (non-) review had not
yet been published, and also that, as Sacco wrote in 1996, any of
my “proposal[s] could have been richer if [I] had taken advantage
of the analyses that others had sketched previously.” 8 If I was an
empiricist, the circumstances of my life were such that I rarely had
6. Samuel, supra note 2, at 25.
7. Id.
8. Rodolfo Sacco, Comparer les droits. À propos de l’ouvrage de Jacques
Vanderlinden, 3 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 659, at 667
(1996).
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much time to spend on “some serious preliminary reading and
research” as defined in five lines by C. Hart and adopted by the
author. 9 For some time the necessities of earning a living, followed
by a huge diversity in my teachings in different places, some of
them with quasi-inexistent legal documentation, a variety of
administrative tasks either in faculty or in running international
associations, and a respectable number of publications which had
no other pretence than ensuring that I would not perish, certainly
prevented me from reading the normally required “analyses that
others had sketched previously.” 10 Full stop again.
4. My only concern today is for the undergraduate student, or
even the postgraduate one, “whose work involves comparison
between legal systems” 11 or who should have reached that stage in
his studies in order “to look beyond law as a discipline” 12 and to
take a course in comparative law. He has first to reassess and
master what law is (i.e. being able to choose between, in
alphabetical order, Dworkin, Hart and Kelsen, among others)
before being “introduced” to comparative law by the author, even
if “the concerns of the comparatist are different” of those of the
legal theorist. 13 My concern is also for all those—far more
numerous—who are apparently excluded from the magic kingdom
where law is being compared. I have, of course, been one of them,
whenever I erred in accordance with the rule model (or any other)
without knowing of the existence of the latter, or even of what law
truly is since the Humanists (by the way, who are they?). Clearly
this “introduction” is conceived—and again this is a choice which
lies within the complete freedom of the author—for a selfproclaimed intellectual elite and this (non-)review should never
have been entrusted to me. And yet, I am fascinated by the book,
as it deals with two words (although I would have preferred the
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Samuel, supra note 2, at 26.
Sacco, supra note 8, at 667.
Samuel, supra note 2, at vii.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 121.
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following three: comparison of laws) with which I have been
familiar for slightly more than half a century.
5. This fascination is tinged with some regrets as my own
experience has been mostly outside the limits that the author—and
again this is his privilege—has assigned to his work. He seems to
deal most not with “law” as such, but with laws as they developed
in Western Europe and spread in the academic world around the
globe from the Renaissance onwards, i.e. the ones he mentions
when presenting the rule model: “a matter of propositional
knowledge expressed in symbols (natural language) themselves
conforming to a system (linguistic) and thus being capable of
treatment and manipulation, to a greater or lesser extent depending
upon the system, by logical operations. It is this logical aspect of
propositional knowledge that has traditionally inspired jurists since
the Humanists to construct ever more coherent systems based on
analogy between law and mathematics.” 14 There we are.
6. This definition clearly has a merit which is too rarely met
among comparatists: being careful that things compared are
comparable. Dworkin, Hart and Kelsen may differ as to what
exactly they consider “law”; they all refer to the same basic social
material and way of thinking. After having practised taxonomy on
a very formal basis and having frequently criticized particular
taxonomic approaches, including those of David or Zweigert and
Kötz, I tend, under a radical pluralist’s view of laws, to limit the
usage of the word “law” in a comparative approach to very near
that adopted by Samuel. I do not believe that Islam (the only
“exotic” “law” he refers to indirectly, citing Glenn) has enough in
common with the law as defined at the end of the previous
paragraph to be “comparable” with the latter. 15 Let me only bring
back to the attention of the reader three more or less explicit
definitions of the shari’a by three specialists: a) “The Shari’a is
the path laid down by the creator; in following it men will find
14. Id. at 122.
15. Id. at 50.
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both moral and material well-being. The Shari’a regulates in great
detail the dealings of individuals with each other and with the
community; it encompasses all man’s duties to God and his fellowmen.” 16 b) “Floating above Muslim society as a disembodied soul,
freed from the currents and vicissitudes of time, it represents the
eternal valid ideal towards which society must aspire.” 17 c) “The
sacred Law of Islam [shari’a] is an all embracing body of religious
duties, the totality of Allah’s commands that regulate the life of
every Muslim in all its aspects; it comprises on an equal footing
ordinances regarding worship and ritual, as well as political and (in
the narrow sense) legal rules.” 18 Would any of these definitions fit
the one quoted in the above paragraph? Asking the question is
answering it. This is, of course also true, of what Glenn has absentmindedly called “chtonic” legal tradition, providing us with a good
example of cultural and legal imperialism to which the author quite
rightly and frequently objects and where I completely share
Legrand’s views about “alterity” as much as he does. 19
7. Thus, there is no room in Samuel’s theory and method of
comparisons for space and time beyond the most classical
theoretical limits of the Western world. This limitation has my
complete sympathy, because it avoids the indescribable confusion
which has spread in “legal” science by putting in the same basket
pre-colonial African, American, Asian or Australasian, without
forgetting religious laws. The comparative taxonomy, which René
David fathered from the 1950’s onwards, was in many cases
unjustifiable whatever method or scheme one adopted. It
unfortunately necessitated a rag-bag in which to forget whatever
was left hanging after categorization or, even worse, was
eliminated from the field of laws and systems, as was the canon
law of the Catholic Church. Yet, Islamic law, was kept in good
16. H. Afchar, The Muslim Conception of Law in INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, VOL. II 86 (Rene David ed., 1975).
17. NOEL J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 2 (1964).
18. JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 1 (1964).
19. See, e.g., Samuel, supra note 2, at 129-130 and 165-166.
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place, being admitted that one, in this instance, did not refer to its
parts kept in force in colonial systems; the latter were an integral
part of the state system of colonial powers and were denied the
quality of “Islamic” law by some experts in the field, among them
Schacht.
8. Having personally experimented—for better and for worse—
with the space and time dimensions of comparison at the very
beginning of my research activity when working on a comparative
history of the concept of code (1954) and African customary laws
in the field (1959), and when comparing the drafting of customary
laws in France and the Netherlands from the 15th to the 18th
century as a teacher, I immediately met the problem of a) defining
the object of my comparisons and b) transferring notions from one
language to another, be they African or European. In the former
was also included the task of deciding where was law, as my
freshly and poorly acquired legal education had led me to believe it
laid. I had, of course no real training in anthropology or history. In
the eyes of Samuel and Legrand, who, happily enough for me,
were still young, I would have been one of the many who even did
not figure that a problem of method existed and just went along
discovering comparison “by gradual trial and error.” 20 No wonder
that, in front of Samuel’s book, I feel like a dinosaur in front of
Rosetta (not Champollion’s stone, but the latest space vehicle.)
9. This does not mean that I did not occasionally discover in
Samuel’s work situations where it would have been most useful by
opening new windows and qualifications on facts I have met in the
past. It also means that I could appreciate the connexion between
some of them and my own attempts at comparing or relativize
them in the light of an enlarged comparison. Among the latter
stands the problem of acquiring the basic knowledge required for
the comparison to take place. Admitting that one cannot ask many
people to be sufficiently familiar with the language, the law and
20. Id. at 3.
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the social fabric of more than two laws, the consequence of it is
that apparently not many would qualify as comparatists according
to Legrand’s requirement, which Samuel seems ready to accept.
The way he presents it is quite satisfying, but, if it was strictly
applied, one may wonder how many people would still qualify as
comparatists, if only at the level of linguistic and cultural
aptitudes. 21 As early as 1985, I was meeting the English word
“home” and could only escape the immediately realized nearimpossibility of translating the word into French by reference to a
popular English song. 22 In order to go much further, i.e. in
Japanese law, I was fortunate to have the assistance of a friend and
colleague who had a doctorate in both law and Far Eastern
languages. When confronted with the Japanese “honkyo” we
started with dictionaries: they sent us to the equivalents “tower of a
castle” and “headquarters of an army.” The possible difference
between the two appeared in two different translations of the
Japanese Civil Code, the one into French using the word “siège”
and the other into English using the word “centre.” Having
discussed the problem in a conference attended by some Japanese
colleagues that I presented at the Institute of Advanced Legal
Studies of the University of London, no consensus could be
reached among them as to a definite choice. Beyond the
dictionaries, I had brought into the picture the military character of
traditional Japanese society, the partly French, partly German
education of Japanese lawyers at the time of the drafting of the
Code, the mittelpunkt (hence centre) dear to Dernburg and in
conflict with the wording of the B.G.B., etc. Thus, I was exploring
avenues in the same way that I had been trying to identify the
sende or the ira in the Zande land tenure system as early as 1959. 23
21. Id. at 144-147.
22. Jacques Vanderlinden, Ubi domicilium, ibi ius universale?, 37 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 303, at 314 for “home” and 312 for
“honkyo” (1985).
23. See Jacques Vanderlinden, Principes de droit foncier zande, 26 REVUE
DE L'INSTITUT DE SOCIOLOGIE 557 (1959).
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But this was apparently not comparative law as Samuel defines it.
The only positive point could perhaps be that in both cases I was
decidedly, but perhaps not sufficiently and thus unsuccessfully,
fighting an automatic direct projection of my own prejudices into
foreign legal systems. But was I therefore an imperialist in the
depth of my multiple selves? God, in whom I do not believe, will
decide on the day of Judgment.
10. Yet one point still leaves me puzzled. How does one decide
to subject two notions or concepts to comparison before starting
the job? The more so as we know and agree that “focusing on
words and dictionaries is not comparative law.” 24 But is it totally
excluded at the very beginning of a jump into the unknown? When
René Dekkers launched me on the path of codification, what was I
looking for? Anything, called in a Romance language, codex, code,
codice and codigo? This would have provided a very limited
answer to his concern. The more so as the word had been attributed
by comparatists and historians to many documents without much
reflexion as to what it covered. Having read Samuel, I have the
feeling that I still do not know what was in theory my solution of
solving the problem by creating a group of “unnamed” codes on
the basis of a first identification of words found in dictionaries.
12. Reading Samuel also led me to some introspection
regarding the reason why one is attracted by the comparison of
laws, a point which, ultimately is not necessarily of interest for his
purpose. As mentioned before, I was pushed into it by the hazards
and necessities of life, and believed that I had entered into
comparison long before getting my first law degree, as I am sure a
majority of students are led to believe by their teachers, including
myself, while studying comparative civil law.
But what about the objectives of comparison? Going through
the volume, one finds:

24. Samuel, supra note 2, at 147.
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– the advancement of knowledge which, as the Author
understands it, is not only acquiring the knowledge of any law, but
also exploring beyond the words of the law and going “deeper into
the histories, sociologies, economics and politics” of the compared
law. 25 This being done, comes:
– the “access to legal mentalities” which comes from a
curiosity about the “other” and especially his inner selves, which
some “critical” or “radical” pluralists (to whose I belong) consider
to be the place where anything legal, normative or willingly factual
starts. 26
– the acquisition of a relative look at things legal, including
one’s own system and, consequently, pushing away any attempt to
“normatively imposing one’s own epistemological interests on
others” (citing Jansen, and immediately punctuated by Samuel’s
“Quite so.”) 27 In fact, the comparatist might believe that he has
become a social anthropologist, which of course is not true. But
between affirming the interest of acceding to foreign mentalities
and realizing such objective there is evidently a formidable gap,
even for an excellent postgraduate student. And, finally:
– the realization of “a dialectic between the domestic body of
law and a foreign body of law” in order to give the comparison of
laws its “meaning and sense”. 28 Here comes again the already
mentioned Legrand’s idea of “alterity” with which I am in full
sympathy.
The three objectives just mentioned do not exclude more
limited ones, of which a characteristic is their relativity. Such is the
case for the elucidation of information between two laws which
may have “some practical value”. 29 But this is immediately
discarded, as either, with the support of Sacco, it can “verge on the
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
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ridiculous,” 30 or, with the support of Legrand, “often be just
vacuous.” 31 Samuel points at the considerable development of the
discipline in the last twenty years and suggests that the existing
literature may contribute to a more theory-oriented discipline with
the risk of a closing itself on itself with the result that “students
may never actually ever get to compare any laws.” 32
But these are far less contestable objectives than the one which
is often concealed behind questionable alibis (the need for
“development” is one of them, which followed the detestable one
for “civilisation”, both under the rags of “modernisation”):
imperialism, be it academic, cultural, ideological, intellectual or
legal. 33 Happily enough, the author has no pardon for comparison
covering such justifications.
13. All in all, comparison blows up the young lawyer’s mind,
and I strongly believe that this can be done without too much
theory or method. As Samuel quite rightly underscores:
“comparative law, at every level, is by no means easy,” 34 the more
so because if one wishes to enlarge the scope of comparison to
societies distant in space and time, the scholar is confronted with a
dramatic lack of the reliable empirical data needed for any
theoretically valid conclusion. One quickly enters the realm of
what I call conjectures and hypotheses, which look more “serious”
than fraud and cunning. But even within such limits the effort is
worthwhile. As soon as the student gets a glimpse at it, comparison
gives him the impression of enlarging his perspectives through
times and spaces as to what law is far away from the canvas he
often must painfully swallow during his first contacts with law.
14. Last but not least, a careful reading of Samuel reveals that
he rarely takes a definite stand on the multiple elements which he
brings to the attention of his reader; he is, in most cases, satisfied
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id.
See, e.g., id. at 6, 9, 17, 63, 78, 121, 129, 130, 147, 151, and 165.
Id. at 9.
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with introducing—is it not precisely what the title of his book
declares straightaway?—various methods and theories and the pros
and cons concerning each of them without passing a “judgment”
on them. Bigotry is evidently not his cup of tea, as it is for some
imprecators against anything which is not their own conception of
comparison in the field of law. In a sense, he definitively is a
pluralist, as he himself emphasizes in the closing lines of his book.
But does he realize that such commitment has its consequences? If
he is what I would call a “traditional” pluralist, i.e. those who carry
on setting pluralism within the State legal structure, there is not
much problem. However, in the view of critical and radical
pluralists like Rod Macdonald and me, he has to locate it within
the infinite variety of individuals’ inner selves, permanently
defining their own law, in which case he might find that
comparison is practically impossible as no single mentality is
comparable to another. This reinforces Legrand’s perspective and
his suggested characterization of comparison as an intercultural
dialogue replacing the traditional approach to comparison. But, if
the author is fundamentally—at least so does he appear to me—a
pluralist, he cannot discard contemptuously any other approach to
the comparison of laws. This should enable him to prepare many
editions of the present capital and most interesting work.

